Middle East Tumult Complicates U.S. Arms Sales

After Moammar Gadhafi lost his grip on the reins of Libya, and then lost his life, the new government inherited a military and police arsenal depleted by civil war and already antiquated. During years of isolation by the broader international community, Gadhafi had found few allies and even fewer arms trading partners, and surplus Russian equipment provided one of the few opportunities to arm his forces.
With a country to defend, the new pro-American government began a series of conversations with the U.S. about purchasing military hardware. Seeing a chance to help a new ally, senators and Defense Department officials encouraged the State Department to approve a series of deals, said sources at the department and on Capitol Hill.
But despite their desire to support the fledgling government, and despite the financial opportunity to help U.S. defense contractors bracing for upcoming budget cuts, State took its time considering the deals.
It wasn’t because Foggy Bottom didn’t see Libya’s need. Rather, the department was compelled by law to assess whether the deals, what would have been foreign military sales (FMS), would be in the national security interests of the U.S. The political situation in Libya was still complicated, so State officials weren’t comfortable. They stalled, holding up potential sales.
It’s a debate likely to repeat between branches and agencies of the U.S. government, with the Middle East still recovering from the Arab Spring but in possession of significant oil wealth and a thirst for military products. The region continues to be one of the chief targets for growth for many U.S. defense contractors. And with the U.S. defense budget facing cuts, both government and industry are eager to expand overseas markets to support the industrial base.
When asked about the pressures surrounding Libya and deals in the Middle East, Andrew Shapiro, assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, described the difficult environment and the need to make sure State retains its authority over weapons sales.
“I have, as part of various interagency debates, had to take on other bureaus and other departments which have other interests in order to enforce [Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s] authority,” Shapiro said. “There’s a reason why that authority was put in the State Department, not the Defense Department. It was to make sure that arms sales support our foreign policy goals and our national security.”
In the case of Libya, last year’s attack in Benghazi, which claimed the lives of four, came and passed without any significant arms deals completed. The Libyan Embassy in the U.S. did not return calls requesting comment on the country’s interest in weapons deals.

Sources at the State Department viewed the incident as vindication of its caution, proof the country is too unstable to safely handle the weapons. Proponents of the deals viewed the lack of response by Libyan authorities to the attacks as proof that other arms were needed.
“They needed all kinds of help, which they could pay for,” said Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., at the 2012 Foreign Policy Initiative forum. “We watched it. We saw the threats to our embassy. We saw the al-Qaida elements coming in. Ten different al-Qaida-affiliated groups are around Benghazi as we speak. We watched it happen, because we didn’t do the things that we knew were necessary to assist them to set up the first government that they’ve ever had. And we obviously paid a very heavy price for it.”
The Libyan example is a dramatic one, but it does expose a difference in philosophy, said Guy Ben-Ari, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
“State tends to demonstrate more caution trying to figure out precisely what parties are in play, whereas DoD tends to approach it with starting off slowly with weapons systems that are not necessarily the high-end, high-intensity types of systems, but maybe more focused on security and internal police types of systems,” Ben-Ari said.
Although relations between the two departments are better than they have been in years, according to department officials, that doesn’t mean they can’t disagree.
Ben-Ari said both sides’ arguments have merit, as there is uncertainty on one side and an opportunity to strengthen ties on the other. “In many cases, the U.S. doesn’t even understand who the parties involved are, to some extent,” he said. “Definitely in Syria and in Libya, that’s also true. You just don’t know who is going to end up in power, but also what their stand is towards allies.”
There’s also something of a divide in the region, between traditional allies that appear more stable and other countries in transition.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE serve as strong markets in relatively stable countries. Most of the other countries undergoing significant change haven’t been major U.S. military hardware importers, with one notable exception: Egypt.
Egypt was a multibillion-dollar market that quickly evaporated during its revolution. Several industry executives cited Egypt as the one country that has had an impact on their sales. And with uncertainty surrounding the country’s foreign policy stance, and questions about the ruling government’s stability, weapons sales carry greater risk.
The State Department looks to assess not only if a government has good intentions toward the U.S., but also whether weapons might be turned on a country’s own people, and if the arms might fall into the hands of extremists.
“We have to take into account the situation on the ground is changing rapidly,” Shapiro said. “We have seen the challenges in arms sales to Egypt, Bahrain, and you mentioned there’s interest from some countries like Libya that are just not there yet. In times of great change and tumult, it requires monitoring it very closely to take into account not just the current situation on the ground, but you have to project out what will happen down the road.”
But that doesn’t mean the State Department wants to deny all deals.
“Our partners, given the greater instability, want the means to provide for their own security,” he said. “While you’re right that we have to look very closely, it is also a time when our partners even more so want to invest in their own security. And we want to work with them to make sure that we’re filling their needs in the appropriate way.”
How the department determines which countries will remain allies and which aren’t ready for weapons can cause interagency disagreement. And if the Middle East continues to be a source for sales, and also sees growing regional tension, the internal debates over arms deals will likely become common.
Despite the ideological differences on arms sales, there’s still a very human element to the determination, Ben-Ari said. “State gets the final say, but DoD gets to make its case,” he said. “It will always be about personality and your ability to make your case.”

OIC calls for a cease-fire in Mali

The Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on Tuesday called for a cease-fire in Mali, where French troops are engaged with the Malian army in an offensive against Islamist fighters .

In a statement, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu called for a cease-fire in the immediate member of his organization, and a return to negotiations between the Malian authorities and Islamists controlling the north of Mali, which were sponsored by Burkina Faso.

U.S. arms to Gulf allies hint of strategy

The largest infusion of U.S. arms ever for Persian Gulf allies has shifted more toward offensive weapons at the same time that President Obama’s military strategy says it will rely more on allied firepower in any future war.

The only war on the horizon for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and four other Gulf coalition partners would be with nearby Iran.
Noting U.S. sales of air defense-penetrating F-16s and F-15s, satellite-guided bombs and a pending order for ordnance that can burrow deep and then explode, analysts say Gulf nations could participate in a U.S. air campaign to strike Iran’s nuclear sites.
These American-armed nations could either be part of an overall war plan or be forced to enter the battle once Iran counterattacks, as expected, with missile launches.
“The thinking certainly is that Iran would retaliate against the Gulf states, or at least against the facilities in the Gulf that we use,” said Kenneth Katzman, a Middle East analyst at the Congressional Research Service. “That would certainly draw the Gulf states into any conflict that went on. The Gulf might become embroiled in this conflict, and I think they’ve calculated it’s best to be prepared.”
There has been public focus on the U.S. military buildup in the Gulf — more aircraft carriers, warplanes and strike groups studded with Tomahawk cruise missiles; more minesweeping ships; a visit by Air Force F-22 stealth jets; and thousands of Army soldiers positioned in Kuwait.
But just as methodically, the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have approved a series of large arms sales that are giving some oil-rich Gulf states offensive capabilities that would make Iran think twice about an attack.
Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta underscored the alliance Dec. 11 when he landed in Kuwait, a staunch Gulf ally, for consultations. He also spoke to some of the 13,500 U.S. troops stationed there.
“Our presence in Kuwait and throughout the Gulf helps advance the capabilities of partnering nations, deters aggression and helps ensure we’re better able to respond to crisis in the region,” Mr. Panetta told reporters beforehand.
At a Kuwait air base, he said America has 50,000 troops and an armada of warships in the region.

Desert Falcons
Mr. Obama’s strategic guidance in January enabled cuts in U.S. troop strength in part by saying that allies would be tasked with providing more firepower in future wars. To observers, that seems to mean the Gulf states would be asked to do more.
The Congressional Research Service, which tracks global arms sales, took special note in its latest report on U.S. weapons pouring into the Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain.
“The U.S. arms agreements with Saudi Arabia were extraordinary, and represent, by far, the largest share of U.S. agreements with the world or developing world in 2011,” the Congressional Research Service said.
Of $56 billion in total U.S. arms sales in 2011 to developing nations, more than half — $33 billion — were inked with the Saudi kingdom. U.S. defense contractors have seen a sales increase from $14 billion in contracts in 2010 to $56 billion in 2011, mostly thanks to oil-rich Gulf states.

In addition, some of the offensive hardware that the Gulf states have received from the U.S. is as good or in some cases better than the U.S. military‘s.
Lockheed Martin has been selling the United Arab Emirates an F-16 “Desert Falcon” version known as “Block 60,” for which the country bankrolled the $3 billion development costs. According to DefenseIndustryDaily.com, it is a notch better than the latest Fighting Falcons flown by U.S. pilots.
The Desert Falcons boast extended range, new radars and targeting pods that clearly make the jet an offensive threat against Iran directly across Gulf waters.
The United Arab Emirates has been buying and flying Block 60s since the previous decade. It plans at some point to add other weapons — 2,000-pound bunker-busting bombs used against buried, cemented targets. Obama administration officials said a year ago that they were working to complete the sale.
“It’s perfectly possible the UAE could be asked to try to bomb aircraft shelters, hardened aircraft hangars’ stockpiles, coastal missile sites that are hardened,” Mr. Katzman said. “There are a range of targets that coalition partners like UAE could be asked to take out as part of strike package, if it comes to that.”
The Saudi stockpile
The United Arab Emirates‘ Sunni Arab neighbor Saudi Arabia also is buying more aggressive weapons.
It signed a deal last year to buy 2,000 joint direct attack munitions — a weapon system that turns unguided bombs into guided missiles, and has been used extensively by the Navy and Air Force to destroy targets in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Saudi Arabia also signed a deal to buy 84 F-15SAs and to upgrade its fleet of 70 warplanes.
The F-15s can unleash a wide array of ordnance, including the satellite-guided joint direct attack munitions, Harpoon ship-blasting missiles and anti-tank bombs called the Sensor-Fuzed Weapon.
Such offensive weapons are increasing in importance to the Gulf, given Israel’s reported plans to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities if the West does not stop the Islamic republic’s pursuit of atomic weapons.
The Gulf states “also see the Shiite-dominated Iran as a general destabilizing force in their neighborhood,” said retired Air ForceLt. Gen. Thomas McInerney, who advocates military action against Tehran.
“Clearly, the Sunni Arabs are very concerned about [Shiites] sweeping across the Arabian Peninsula into Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, fueled by Iran’s leadership and resources,” Gen. McInerney said. “The U.S. sale of modern aircraft and weapons is designed to help them cope with this threat.”
He said the Gulf nations also are banking on assistance to which they would never admit publicly. “Covertly, they are supporting the Israelis’ counter [to the Shiites],” he said.
From Iran’s vantage point, the Persian Gulf looks like this: The U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet, based in Bahrain, constantly patrols the waterway. To the west and south on land, the Gulf nations are acquiring an increasingly potent arsenal of planes, missiles and bombs.
“We have been selling these countries weapons of varying sophistication for 20-plus years as part of our overall approach to ensuring regional security and stability,” said James Russell, an instructor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif.
“We really ramped up our entire defense relationships with these countries after we ejected [Iraqi dictator] Saddam Hussein from Kuwait,” said Mr. Russell, a former Pentagon official involved in foreign arms sales. “We went around the region concluding Defense Cooperation Agreements with each of these states, except Saudi Arabia, which provided a framework for arms sales, prepositioned equipment, forward deployed forces, and training and exercises.
“We want these countries to be able to defend themselves and be able to operate and train with us, since we are the ones ultimately guaranteeing the security of the region,” Mr. Russell said.

Sunni Leaders Gaining Clout In Mideast

New York Times
November 28, 2012
Pg. 1

News Analysis

Sunni Leaders Gaining Clout In Mideast

By Neil MacFarquhar

RAMALLAH, West Bank — For years, the United States and its Middle East allies were challenged by the rising might of the so-called Shiite crescent, a political and ideological alliance backed by Iran that linked regional actors deeply hostile to Israel and the West.
But uprising, wars and economics have altered the landscape of the region, paving the way for a new axis to emerge, one led by a Sunni Muslim alliance of Egypt, Qatar and Turkey. That triumvirate played a leading role in helping end the eight-day conflict between Israel and Gaza, in large part by embracing Hamas and luring it further away from the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah fold, offering diplomatic clout and promises of hefty aid.
For the United States and Israel, the shifting dynamics offer a chance to isolate a resurgent Iran, limit its access to the Arab world and make it harder for Tehran to arm its agents on Israel’s border. But the gains are also tempered, because while these Sunni leaders are willing to work with Washington, unlike the mullahs in Tehran, they also promote a radical religious-based ideology that has fueled anti-Western sentiment around the region.
Hamas — which received missiles from Iran that reached Israel’s northern cities — broke with the Iranian axis last winter, openly backing the rebellion against the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad. But its affinity with the Egypt-Qatar-Turkey axis came to fruition this fall.
“That camp has more assets that it can share than Iran — politically, diplomatically, materially,” said Robert Malley, the Middle East program director for the International Crisis Group. “The Muslim Brotherhood is their world much more so than Iran.”
The Gaza conflict helps illustrate how Middle Eastern alliances have evolved since the Islamist wave that toppled one government after another beginning in January 2011. Iran had no interest in a cease-fire, while Egypt, Qatar and Turkey did.
But it is the fight for Syria that is the defining struggle in this revived Sunni-Shiite duel. The winner gains a prized strategic crossroads.
For now, it appears that that tide is shifting against Iran, there too, and that it might well lose its main Arab partner, Syria. The Sunni-led opposition appears in recent days to have made significant inroads against the government, threatening the Assad family’s dynastic rule of 40 years and its long alliance with Iran. If Mr. Assad falls, that would render Iran and Hezbollah, which is based in Lebanon, isolated as a Shiite Muslim alliance in an ever more sectarian Middle East, no longer enjoying a special street credibility as what Damascus always tried to sell as “the beating heart of Arab resistance.”
If the shifts seem to leave the United States somewhat dazed, it is because what will emerge from all the ferment remains obscure.

Clearly the old leaders Washington relied on to enforce its will, like President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, are gone or at least eclipsed. But otherwise confusion reigns in terms of knowing how to deal with this new paradigm, one that could well create societies infused with religious ideology that Americans find difficult to accept. The new reality could be a weaker Iran, but a far more religiously conservative Middle East that is less beholden to the United States.
Already, Islamists have been empowered in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, while Syria’s opposition is being led by Sunni insurgents, including a growing number identified as jihadists, some identified as sympathizing with Al Qaeda. Qatar, which hosts a major United States military base, also helps finance Islamists all around the region.
In Egypt, President Mohamed Morsi resigned as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood only when he became head of state, but he still remains closely linked with the movement. Turkey, the model for many of them, has kept strong relations with Washington while diminishing the authority of generals who were longstanding American allies.
“The United States is part of a landscape that has shifted so dramatically,” said Mr. Malley of the International Crisis Group. “It is caught between the displacement of the old moderate-radical divide by one that is defined by confessional and sectarian loyalty.”
The emerging Sunni axis has put not only Shiites at a disadvantage, but also the old school leaders who once allied themselves with Washington.
The old guard members in the Palestinian Authority are struggling to remain relevant at a time when their failed 20-year quest to end the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands makes them seem both anachronistic and obsolete.
“Hamas has always argued that it is the future of the changes in the region because of its revolutionary nature, that it is part of the religious political groups who have been winning the revolutions,” said Ghassan Khatib, an official at Birzeit University and former government spokesman.
The Palestinian Authority’s leader, Mahmoud Abbas, will address the United Nations General Assembly on Thursday to request that it recognize Palestine as a nonmember state. The resolution is expected to pass, but analysts view it as too little, too late in the face of the new regional mood.
At a busy Ramallah bakery, that mood was readily evident.
“If this situation continues, so what if Abu Mazen gets recognition, so what?” said Salah Abdel Hamad, 50, a teacher, referring to Mr. Abbas. “It will not bring any substantial change.”
The bakery’s owner dared hang in the window a mourning poster for Ahmed al-Jabari, the Hamas military chief whose assassination by Israel helped to set off the latest conflict.
“The resistance,” said Tha’er al-Baw, 23, referring to Hamas, “proved that they are much better than the negotiating camp. In the days of Arafat, we used to think peace could be achieved through negotiations, but nobody believes this now.”
Even before the conflict, the emir of Qatar visited Gaza, promising $400 million in aid. Qatar did not donate that sum just to have its investment bombed to smithereens every few years.
As Egypt’s president, Mr. Mubarak, who reviled the Muslim Brotherhood, was basically content to have Israel periodically smash Hamas, effectively the Brotherhood’s Gaza cousin.
Mr. Morsi changed little from Mr. Mubarak’s playbook, though his tone shifted. He sent his prime minister to lift morale. Ten foreign ministers, including those of Turkey and the newly Islamist government in Tunisia, also part of the new axis, visited Gaza during the fighting.
Egypt, Qatar and Turkey all want a more quiet, stable Middle East, which they have said repeatedly requires an end to the Israeli occupation. But the new Islamist governments do not talk about a two-state solution much, so analysts believe some manner of long-term truce is more likely.
“As Hamas moves closer to Turkey, Egypt and Qatar, it will be weaker as a ‘resistance’ movement because those three countries do not want a resistance movement,” said Talal Atrissi, a Lebanese academic specializing in Arab-Iranian relations.
Those countries will not supply arms, however, so Hamas will maintain contacts with Tehran. Khaled Meshal, the Hamas leader, told CNN that ties are “not as it used to be in the past, but there is no severing of relations.”
Where Hamas and Hezbollah were once allies, the fact that they are now at times at loggerheads illustrates the shift to the new Sunni axis.
A Western diplomat seeking to explain the changes recently drew a cross through the region, the meeting point representing Syria. Along the East-West line, he wrote “febrile crescent,” a play on the traditional “Fertile Crescent” used to describe the stretch of the Middle East where civilization began. The febrile crescent represents the volatile fault line between Sunnis and Shiites, with Syria the prize.
The other axis was labeled “Sunni Struggles,” representing the wrestling within the dominant Muslim sect over what governments and what ideology will emerge triumphant from the current political tumult. The deepest change, of course, is that the era of dictators seems to be closing.
“These are populist governments, which are much more attuned to the domestic public opinion than were previous regimes,” said Rashid Khalidi, an Arab studies professor at Columbia University. “Before the Arab revolutions you had a frozen situation where it was easy to see how things would go.”

Piracy drops by 54% in Gulf of Aden

Ahead of the upcoming Seatrade Middle East Maritime exhibition and conference, the International Maritime Bureau's (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre confirms that pirate attacks off the Somali coast have declined by more than 54%, leading to a softening of insurance premiums for the global shipping community but raising controversy surrounding the use of onboard private armed security contractors.

According to IMB September 2012 figures, global attacks on commercial and private vessels stood at 225 incidents year-to-date with 70 recorded attacks off the Somali coast, with 11 ships seized and 188 hostages currently being held for ransom. In the first six months of 2012 IMB recorded a 54% drop in pirate activity against 2011, with 177 incidents reported against 266 in the same period last year, supported by additional data released by the United States Navy.

While moves to thwart piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden appear to be paying off, the IMB says that Somali piracy in the Indian Ocean gives serious ongoing cause for concern, as well as noting a shift in geographical focus from East to West Africa. Increased attacks are also being reported in the Gulf Of Guinea, Nigeria and Togo, as well as further afield in Indonesian waters.

"The world's busiest trading routes are still suffering from the ongoing threat of piracy, which costs global trade up to US$12 billion annually. Aggressive patrolling by international combined naval forces and the increase - over the last 12 months - in the use of private armed security contractors onboard vessels, are acting as an effective deterrent in many cases, but the regulatory oversight of these emerging number of private firms is currently a 'grey area'," said Chris Hayman, Chairman of Seatrade.

This, and other security issues, will be debated by a panel of industry experts at Seatrade Middle East Maritime's 2012 conference, with a dedicated session taking place on Wednesday 28th November to assess the current state of the maritime industry's response to piracy and how best to move forward in developing a safer, more effective and more accountable defence response. Confirmed speakers include Peter Cook, Security Director and Founder, Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI); Roberto Giorgi, President, V Ships; Pottendal Mukundan, Director, International Maritime Bureau; Simon Osborne, Regional Director, Protection Vessels International (PVI) and Todd J Offutt, Commander US Coastguard, Officer in Charge, US Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO).

Currently, some three dozen warships patrol more than one million square miles of territory, with the European Union Naval Force antipiracy operation including ships from the UK Royal Navy and EU country members, as well presence from the US Navy, Russia, India, China and NATO.

"The third link in the chain is training for commercial ship captains in evasive techniques, as well as the introduction of protective measures including barbed wire defences and powerful water hose facilities are also proving to be highly effective, and forcing pirates to turn to smaller, less lucrative vessels rather than large oil tankers and cargo ships," said Hayman.

In its Q3 2012 report entitled 'Pirates and Privateers: Managing the Indian Ocean's private security room', Australia's Lowy Institute for International Policy raises concerns regarding the legitimacy of the more than 140 companies currently offering private contractor services, and highlighting regulatory issues and instances of international disputes over the last year as a pressing issue for the industry and governments in troubled international waters.

The three-day Seatrade conference programme is split into three daily sessions, with industry leaders from across the globe participating in panel discussions that will examine the state of the industry and offer an interactive platform for delegates to share experiences and expert insight.